Puzzles about the seventh definition of the sophist

I’m confused about the seventh definition of the sophist and I want to do the blogging equivalent to thinking out loud.¹ Just a warning – this is, to say the least, a very long blog entry that assumes a good familiarity with the Sophist and the method of collection and division. So if you’re interested, read away…but if not, well, I’ll post more about cats or food or complaints about the weather soon enough.

Here’s how the visitor defines sophistry:

Imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and unknowing sort, of the appearance making kind of copy-making, the word juggling part of production that’s marked off as human and not divine.”

τὸ δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλ’ ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον
(Sophist 268cd)

This definition is moving from the species to the genus and, well, doesn’t make much sense without the context of what’s gone before. So let me flesh it out a bit, starting from genus and moving down to species. To do this I’ll give each stage of the division, beginning with the division between production and acquisition and ending with the division between private elenchus and speechifying in crowds. OK. So sophistry is the art of:

Production (as opposed to acquisition)
More particularly, human production (as opposed to divine production)
Human production of images (as opposed to production of original objects
Images which are appearances (as opposed to likenesses)
These appearances are imitations in that the craftsman uses himself to make the appearance (as opposed to using tools to make the appearance)²
This is a form of belief-mimicry in that the craftsman makes appearances being ignorant of the things they’re imitating (as opposed to making the appearances with knowledge of the original).
It is insincere imitation, though, in that the craftsman fears that he does not know and so simply pretends to know (as opposed to one who truly believes he knows)
And, finally, it is the activity of using short speeches in private conversation to force one’s interlocutor to contradict himself (as opposed to using longer speeches in crowds)

So that’s a more sensical, I think, restatement of the definition, giving some indication of the divisions that the visitor makes to get to the final definition. Several of these divisions, though, are really difficult to make sense of…so I want to pay particular attention to the divisions I find most problematic/unclear.

Images vs. Likenesses
We don’t see much about the distinction between likenesses and appearances in the divisions leading to the sophist at the end of the dialogue. Indeed we get little more than a mention:

Let’s recall that one part of copy-making is likeness-making. The other kind was going to be appearance-making, if falsity appeared to be truly falsity and by nature one of those that are. (266d)

Wow. Really illuminating, right? Fortunately, we get quite a bit more on this distinction earlier. (And the visitor’s ‘recall’ (ἀναμνησθῶμεν) is a good indication that we should look back to what was said previously for help here.)

The visitor distinguishes between likenesses and appearances at 235-6, before the long discussion about the nature of being and not-being. Here’s how the Visitor characterizes them:

Likeness: “One type of imitation I see is the art of likeness-making. That’s the one we have whenever someone produces an imitation by keeping to the proportions of length, breadth, and depth of his model, and also by keeping to the appropriate colors of its parts” (235de)

And

Appearance: “Not the ones who sculpt or draw very large works. If they reproduce the true proportions of their beautiful subjects, you see, the upper parts would appear smaller than they should, and the lower parts would appear larger…so don’t those craftsmen say goodbye to truth, and produce in their images the proportions that seem to be beautiful instead of the real ones?…Now, what are we going to call something that appears to be like a beautiful thing, but only because it’s seen from a viewpoint that’s not beautiful (οὐκ καλοῦ), and would seem unlike the thing it claims to be like if you came to be able to see such large things adequately? If it appears the way the thing does but in fact isn’t like it, isn’t it an appearance?” (236ab)³

So both likenesses and appearances are imitations. Likenesses are actually like the object they imitate while appearances are crafted to simply appear like the object they imitate because it’s seen from a viewpoint that’s not beautiful. Seems like a reasonable distinction so far.

While the discussion here places a heavy emphasis on physical imitations of things – paintings and sculptures and the like – this division is meant to hold for non-physical imitations, too. The person who has this expertise is able to trick youth “when they stand even farther from the truth about things”. The expert does this “by showing them spoken copies of everything, so as to make them believe that the words and true and the person who’s speaking to them is the wisest person there is…” (234c)

How do we make sense of this distinction between likenesses and appearances when it comes to words? A likeness retains all of the features of the original (all the proportions, colors, etc), an appearance distorts certain features so that it appears like the original from certain non-fine vantage points. A likeness-account, then, will not distort features of the original, an appearance-account will so that the account appears like the original from certain non-fine vantage points. First worry: will any account be non-distorting? If I try to make a copy, in words, of a physical object, then the account will surely be distorting. No matter how much my account accurately describes, say, an apple, my account won’t look, sound, or taste like an apple. But what about accounts of non-sensible objects? I take it (?) that an account of justice won’t itself be just. The various words used to describe, or define, justice won’t themselves be just. Or resemble justice.

But I suppose I might be being uncharitable (or deliberately obtuse). I suppose we can say that an account of, e.g., justice, that presents a true characterization, that offers the correct definition of justice, that places justice in its true context and shows its true proportions and relations with other objects, and so forth. An account that does this is a likeness whereas an account that offers certain distortions is an appearance.

But in his description of appearances, the Visitor tells us why there are distortions: because the viewpoint is not beautiful/fine/καλον. This must mean (right?) that the craftsman will know what the original looks like (the correct proportions, colors, and so forth), will realize that the viewpoint is not fine and what problems it poses, and how to distort the imitation accordingly so that it appears like the original from the non-fine viewpoint. The craftsman is going to have a lot of knowledge.

So will this hold also for word-based appearances? Will the craftsman of these also have to (1) know what the original is like, (2) know that there is an imperfect viewpoint and why it’s imperfect, and (3) know how to correct for the imperfect viewpoint to create something that appears like the original from that viewpoint? If the appearance must actually looks like the original from some inferior perspective, then I’m inclined to think that you do need some knowledge of the original.⁴ As an example (?), Kant’s Groundwork is very difficult to understand for students just beginning philosophy. They don’t yet have tools of reasoning required to really understand Kant⁵, they haven’t read his other works to help put the Groundwork in context, and so forth. They do not have, we might say, a fine viewpoint at which to think about Kant. When I teach the Groundwork, then, I might distort things so that they can better understand him from their rather poor viewpoint. I might leave out quite difficult bits or slightly change what he says so it makes more sense. The resulting lecture resembles what Kant actually says, it’s an appearance. But there are distortions. It’s not a completely accurate portrayal. And a Kant scholar, who has a good viewpoint of the Groundwork, would be appalled at my lecture. But I can’t be ignorant of Kant in order to make my appearance. Creating a good “appearance” of Kant in my lecture requires that I know the Kant that I’m representing. If I was ignorant of Kant then my appearance of him wouldn’t appear like it at all, even from the poor perspective of the undergraduates.

So appearances do involve distortions and other forms of falsehood, but the practitioner of the techne that produces appearances needs to have some knowledge/awareness of the original in order to make the appearance he does.

This is a lot about the distinction between images and appearances. I realize this. But it’s a really crucial distinction in our way to getting a definition of the sophist and worth the attention.

OK. Our next division:

Imitating from Knowledge vs Imitating from Ignorance

In many ways this is the most problematic division for me. It brings up several issues that I simply don’t know how to make sense of.

Here’s what the visitor says about this division:

Some imitators know what they’re imitating and some don’t. And what division is more important than the one between ignorance and knowledge?
– None.
– Wasn’t the imitation that we just mentioned the kind that’s associated with knowledge? Someone who knew you and your character might imitate you, mightn’t he?
– Of course.
– What about the character of justice and all of virtue taken together? Don’t many people who are ignorant of it, but have some beliefs about it, try hard to cause what they believe it is to appear to be present in them. And don’t they imitate it in their words and actions as much as they can?
– Very many people are like that.
– And are they all unsuccessful at seeming to be just without being just at all? Or is the opposite true?
– Yes, the opposite.

First, what is the visitor’s “imitation that we just mentioned” (τό γε ἄρτι λεχθὲν) referring to? The talk of appearances back at 235-6? I’d really like to be clearer on what the referent of this is.

The sophist is an individual who makes appearances without knowledge, so let’s focus on that. Here’s how I (barely) understand this passage: an individual may be ignorant of, say, the true nature of justice. Regardless of his ignorance, though, he may have (false?) beliefs about the nature of justice. This ignorant individual, though, is going to try to have that false conception of justice appear to be in his character. He may falsely believe, for example, that justice involves helping his friends and harming his enemies. He can then try quite hard to have that sort of justice in his soul (or merely the appearance of this sort of justice in his soul?) and manifest in his words and actions. In this way, then, he is creating an appearance of something. But what is that appearance of? It’s of his false conception of justice, I take it. (Or the appearance that he has this false conception of justice?)

Arg. That is quite unclear. Let’s put this another way. Let’s have ‘J’ stand for the true conception of justice and ‘FJ’ stand for the false conception of justice. Only someone with knowledge will believe/know J. The ignorant individual will believe FJ and will try to have FJ “appear to be present in them…[and] in their words and actions as much as they can…” (267c). This individual is creating an appearance (in his soul), but what is he creating an appearance of? It looks like he’s creating an appearance of FJ (or perhaps the appearance that he has FJ in his character). It does not all all seem to be an appearance of J. Why? Because it may not have any resemblance at all to J.

Consider a case involving generosity. I may be completely ignorant of what it means to be generous but falsely believe that being generous involves, say, not kicking dogs and going to church on Sundays. Believing this, and wanting to be generous, I create an appearance of my false conception of generosity in myself. But someone who truly knows what generosity is like will look at the instantiation of my false conception of generosity (my tendencies to not kick dogs and attend church on Sundays) and (quite reasonably!) say “Whatever it is, it’s not an appearance of generosity that you’re displaying.” To be an appearance or imitation of something, it’s got to actually, you know, appear like or imitate the object in question. And appearing like or imitating that thing seems to require that one have at least some awareness of the thing one’s imitating.

So now it looks like we’ve got four sorts of things:
J = Justice
AJ = An appearance of justice (involves some distortions, but still is a resemblance⁶
FJ = False justice / false conception of justice
AFJ = An appearance of the false conception of justice

And I don’t really see why there needs to be any real connection between J and FJ and so also between AJ and AFJ (or J and AFJ…)

One more example: Consider the personality of, say, Peter. We can have:
P = Peter’s personality
AP = an appearance of Peter’s personality (involves some distortions but is still a resemblance). We get this when someone who knows Peter and his personality and imitates it.
FP = a false conception of Peter’s personality. This is, I take it, a set of false beliefs about what Peter is like, believed by someone ignorant of Peter and his personality.
AFP = an appearance of the false conception of Peter. This is when someone offers an imitation based on his false conception of Peter.

FP need not, I take it, be anything like P. If I have no idea who Peter is, then I may falsely believe that Peter is a buffoon who takes nothing seriously, who is rude and stupid, misogynistic and racist. (Perhaps I heard about this from someone else who had an ax to grind about Peter.) But in truth Peter could be the most wonderful and good person to have ever graced this earth. My imitation of FP (even if I say that I’m imitating Peter) then will be nothing like Peter. There is no resemblance at all, then, between P and FP and AFP will not in any way be an appearance of P. Instead it will be an appearance of FP.⁷

It is quite possible, then, to create an appearance of something that you claim to be like the original but in truth is nothing at all like the original. You’ve still created an appearance, but you’ve now created an appearance of your false conception of the original. The appearance made by the knower, then, will be an appearance of a different thing than the appearance made by the ignorant person.⁸

Does that make sense? Anyone? Anyone? Bueller?

I’m still not entirely sure whether I’m committed to this. All I’m trying to do right now is make sense of stuff that doesn’t really make sense to me. So let’s move on to the next distinction:

Sincerely imitating vs. Insincerely imitating

Again, let’s start with the text:

One sort of belief-mimic [imitate w/o knowledge] is foolish and thinks he knows the things he only has beliefs about. The other sort has been around a lot of discussions and so by temperament he’s suspicious and fearful that he doesn’t know the things that he pretends in front of others to know. (268a)

OK. This seems straightforward enough. Both individuals are ignorant. One is unaware of his ignorance, he actually thinks he knows. So when he creates the appearance of FP, he does so sincerely. The other is more suspicious, is more fearful. It’s not like this guy is sure he doesn’t know, it’s just that he’s not sure he knows. But he pretends to know in front of others.

Again, more wailing and gnashing of teeth. Why? Because doesn’t appearance from ignorance require sincerity? Recall that appearances are being produced in the soul of the individual who has certain beliefs and tries very hard to cause what he believes to appear to be present in him. But surely you wouldn’t try very hard to create this appearance if you didn’t have much conviction about your beliefs. If I truly feared that I was wrong that justice involved harming my enemies and helping my friends then it would be strange to try hard to have that conception of justice come to be/appear in my character.

One might reply, saying that my reading of the knowing/ignorant distinction was wrong. The production of the appearance does not come about by FJ appearing in the ignorant individual but rather the insincere person can want to appear to have FJ in them while not actually having FJ in them (because they fear they don’t actually know FJ). But if this is what the appearance is (appearing to be FJ while not actually being FJ) then what appearance does the foolish person have? The foolish person who actually thinks he has knowledge will not simply want to appear like FJ is present in him. He’ll actually want to be FJ (just according to his false conception of justice). So if we take this other reading of the knowing/ignorant distinction then it looks only the insincere person (who wants to only appear FJ) will be creating an appearance. The sincere person won’t be creating any appearance at all. But he has to since he, too, falls under the ‘producing appearances’ wing of the division.

So, continuing along the same vein, I don’t know what sense to make of this division, especially in light of the division immediately previous to it.

And we’re not even done yet. We have the final division.

Short elenctic speeches in private vs long speeches to a crowd

Here’s the relevant passage:

I see that one sort can maintain his insincerity in long speeches to a crowd, and the other uses short speeches in private conversation to force the person talking with him to contradict himself. (268b)

The first most immediate observation is that this is not a dichotomous division like previous divisions. We don’t see the visitor first divide between public and private or between short speeches and long. We don’t see any of that. Instead we get this quite striking division between short and private discussions and long and public (in a crowd) speeches. I’ll just note this and move along. (OK. I’ll just ask “WHY?!?!!!” and move along. Because I don’t know why. And I want to.)

Next, the sophist engages in the latter of the two activities. He “uses short speeches in private conversation to force the person talking with him to contradict himself.” I’m going to stipulate that this is elenchus. It looks quite damned close to the activity of Socrates, at the very least. I suppose it could be more like the activities of the eristic sophists (as in the Euthydemus. But I think one might very reasonably inquire as to the differences in method between that sort of eristic and elenchus.

What does seem quite clear is that this activity is purely negative. The sophist is not creating any appearances here. He’s not putting forward any positive doctrine, he’s not giving any beliefs to his interlocutors. All he’s doing is destroying beliefs that his interlocutors have. The sophist, then, is not producing appearances in anyone else. The only appearances the sophist is creating are in his own soul (as was seen/discussed in the knowledge/ignorance division above).

Indeed, once we see that the method used by the sophist is purely negative, it becomes much more unclear why it is that the definition of the sophist extends beyond the appearance making feature of the sophist (in the knowledge/ignorance division). After we get that, what we see is no longer relevant to the sophist producing appearances but instead describes how the sophist interacts with those around him. But, as I already noted, his interactions with others do not create appearances. If anything, they destroy them.

I suppose we can say that the sophist’s activities lead individuals from being sincere appearance makers to insincere appearance makers. After all, it was engagement in discussions that led the sophist to fear he didn’t have knowledge. But that – moving from sincerity to insincerity – isn’t a sort of production, I take it. If anything, it’s a sort of cleansing or removal insofar as one’s conviction that he’s right is removed.

(Right? ???)

Finally, even if we accept everything else, it’s striking that the sophist is defined as someone engaging in elenctic activities. What about the speechifying Protagoras or Gorgias? What about the false statesmen of the Statesman (who the visitor calls the greatest sophists of all the sophists)? What sense do we make of these individuals and of their activities when they engage in methods of presentation other than elenchus? Is it no longer sophistry? That, it seems to me, would be a very unhappy conclusion.

And that’s that. Those are my thoughts about the seventh definition. And, as is abundantly clear, I can’t make much, if any, sense of it. Can you sense my frustration? I fear that, on account of my frustration, I’m being a bit more uncharitable than I should be, so perhaps at some point I’ll write up some entry where I offer an explanation (rather than just a series of puzzles) about the seventh definition. For now, though, I’ll sign off, in aporia.

---

1. With the usual caveats of (a) there’s likely been stuff written about the seventh definition that I either haven’t read or am not going to take into account. I work best by trying to figure out how I want to make sense of the passage before figuring out how others have, and (b) there’s a lot of terminology and underlying assumptions that I won’t really explain. Lots of talk of collection and division, etc.↩
2. ??This falls out in the restatement of the definition quoted above. There the visitor talks about ‘word-juggling’. I take it that that refers to this part of the division. (??) ↩
3. I’ll just note my dissatisfaction with translating καλον and its derivatives as ‘beautiful’ throughout this passage. I think using ‘fine’ and ‘finely’ is a bit better here.↩
4. Perfect/complete knowledge of the original? Probably not.↩
5. Though, let’s be honest, can anyone truly understand Kant?↩
6. I suppose that someone with knowledge will always only imitate justice insofar as we don’t become justice with knowledge of justice.↩
7. I belabor points. I belabor them because I have but a tenuous grasp of them.↩
8. Why don’t we have a proper noun for ‘ignorant person’? I guess we’ve got ‘ignoramus’, eh? But that seems to have a connotation of ‘stupid’ rather than ‘ignorant’?↩

---